Personhood and Creation in an Age of Robots and AI: Can We Say “You” to Artefacts? by Burdett, Michael
Artificial Intelligence and Robotics:
Contributions from the Science and Religion
Forum
with Gillian K. Straine, “Artificial Intelligence and Robotics: Contributions from the
Science and Religion Forum”; Michael S. Burdett, “Personhood and Creation in an Age of
Robots and AI: Can We Say “You” to Artifacts?”; Mohammad Yaqub Chaudhary, “The
Artificialization of Mind and World”; and David Hipple, “Encounters with Emergent
Deities: Artificial Intelligence in Science Fiction Narrative.”
PERSONHOOD AND CREATION IN AN AGE OF ROBOTS
AND AI: CAN WE SAY “YOU” TO ARTIFACTS?
by Michael S. Burdett
Abstract. This article explores the extent to which the I-You re-
lation should be applied to domains other than the human and the
divine focusing particularly on artifacts and technology. Drawing first
on the work of Martin Buber, Gabriel Marcel, and Martin Heidegger,
I contend that the I-You tradition has maintained I-You relations with
objects are possible even when these same figures level strong critiques
of the I-It relation. I extend these discussions and argue that some kind
of You-speaking for artifacts is needed to combat rampant consump-
tion and reduction of the world to pure utility. But, I equally suggest
that there are limitations to applying the I-You relation to artifacts
precisely when doing so keeps us from having genuine relationships
with other people as outlined by psychologist Sherry Turkle. Finally, I
outline how this proposal impacts the doctrine of creation. In sum, it
expands our intuitions of what is included in that doctrine creation.
Keywords: Martin Buber; creation; Martin Heidegger; I and
Thou; Gabriel Marcel; panpsychism; personalism; posthumanism;
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Spike Jonze, the director of such films as Being John Malkovich, Adaptation
and Where the Wild Things Are, recently won an Academy Award for his
film Her. In the film Joaquin Phoenix’s character, Theodore, purchases
a new computer operating system, an OS1, that claims to be the first
artificially intelligent operating system of its kind: “it’s not an operating
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system, it’s a consciousness” the advertisements say. Theodore is a lonely
man. He is in the middle of a divorce and his social life is rather pathetic.
Throughout the film, Theodore becomes deeply attached to the artificial
intelligence voiced by Scarlett Johansson who goes by the name Samantha
and he eventually falls in love with it.
We pity Theodore initially. His life seems unrelentingly boring, unbear-
able, and groundless. Yet, we are a captivated audience by the end and
have even been moved by Theodore’s personal transformation through his
relationship with Samantha, the artificial intelligence. What makes Her
such an interesting movie in this genre is the way it teases out the inherent
ambiguity of how we are meant to feel about Phoenix’s relationship with
Samantha, the artificial intelligence. It seems out of place for him to have
such a deep attachment, to love this artificial intelligence but perhaps the
ends justify the means here because the loving relationship has led him to
a place of healing and supposed personal thriving.
None of this is new. We have been talking about relationships with
nonhumans in science fiction for ages: from the Terminator films to 2001
and Blade Runner. But, now we can ask Siri questions on our iPhones, talk
to a bot online or own a robotic pet.1 Artificial intelligence and robotics
promises to get more advanced and people today are relying more and
more upon them. The artificial is increasingly encroaching into every area
of human activity and intelligent artifacts are becoming a perennial feature
of our everyday lives. Hence, there does not seem to be a substantial
leap from our present world to that found in the film Her. The plot,
however, may seem far-fetched and perhaps even outlandish to those who
have not seen it, yet Jonze seems to be tapping into some issues that are
becoming increasingly significant in our time because of this technological
proliferation. The shear sophistication of these artificial intelligences invites
us to ask tough questions such as: What do we make of those relationships
we have with artificial entities? What is my responsibility to them? Is loving
them, as we saw in Her, misplaced or is it virtuous? What constitutes a
person? Is this a category reserved only for human beings?
But these are not just questions for science fiction, they are deeply philo-
sophical and theological questions for today. Indeed, they underlie some
of the most publically worrying, philosophical questions about the current
development of so-called “artificial general intelligence”: artificial intelli-
gence that intentionally seeks to achieve human levels of intelligence and
understanding.2 Asking them in a theological register might involve touch-
ing upon a myriad of topics in theology and religion such as ecotheology,
important distinctions between idols and icons, the nature and ethics of
love and especially a theology of creation. All of these issues play a part in
the guiding question throughout this essay, namely: “Can we say ‘You’ to
artifacts (things/objects in the world)?”
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Upfront I need to clarify some terms I will be using throughout this
presentation. I will be utilizing two neologisms that have a strong heritage
in theology and philosophy in the last century and they find their strongest
elucidation in the work of the Jewish philosopher Martin Buber and his
seminal text (Buber 1970). Buber contends there are two ways one interacts
with the world. The first is the I-It relation—the first term. In the I-It
relation one encounters the world over and against it and is characterized
by objectification and use (Buber 1970, 75). The “I” relates to an “It.” The
individual’s comportment is to see the world as object. The other neologism
is that of the I-You. This relation, first and foremost is a dialogue, a face-to-
face encounter where one’s attention is entirely taken up by “You” (Buber
1970, 59). In the I-You relation one speaks to another rather than about
this other. One says “You” directly to someone else and is locked attentively
in a gaze that concentrates and is open to this “You.”
The I-You relation is most commonly and straightforwardly applied
to the sphere of human interaction. But, an increasingly technologically
cluttered environment entails greater relation with artifacts in this world,
the seeming domain of the I-It. Many proponents of the I-You tradition
have expressed that the I-You relation need not be limited to just human
interaction. As we will come to see, it has been used as the basis for a
proper understanding of the divine (Buber 1970, 57) and, we are told, we
can have this kind of relation with natural objects such as plants, rivers,
and mountains as well. Yet, very little attention has been devoted to “the
made.” Can we have this relation to human-created objects as well?
My aim in this article is to evaluate the extent to which the I-You relation
should be applied to domains other than the human and the divine focusing
particularly on artifacts and technology. It will be argued that some kind of
You-speaking for artifacts is needed to combat rampant consumption and
reduction of the world to pure utility. But, it will be equally argued that
there are limitations to applying the I-You relation to artifacts precisely
when doing so keeps us from having genuine relationships with other
people. I will advocate that we should have person-like relationships with
artifacts but that this You-speaking is different and limited when compared
with the human sphere.
To do this, I will first look at three figureheads of the I-You tradition:
Martin Heidegger, Gabriel Marcel, and Martin Buber, and lay claim to
what they say about artifacts and how we relate to them at present and
how we ought to relate to them. Second, I will turn to the work of
applied theologian, Stephen Pattison, who advocates for more person-like
relationships with artifacts, and come to an understanding of how humans
rely upon objects for their very personhood and why it is appropriate to
speak about objects in terms of persons. Third, I will then rely on the
work of MIT psychologist, Sherry Turkle, to examine the limitations and
drawbacks of treating artifacts as persons, particularly when it comes to
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highly complex artifacts such as we see with social robots and other high-
tech technologies. Finally, several comments will be made relating these
conclusions to how far we ought to speak You to artifacts.
MARTIN HEIDEGGER
Martin Heidegger, the twentieth century German philosopher, is one who
has reflected deeply on the human being’s relation to the world and has
devoted substantial attention to artifacts and technology. In his earlier
works, such as Being and Time where he gives a probing analysis, an
existential analytic, of the human being, Dasein, Heidegger contends that
a basic mode of being for the human is what he refers to as ‘readiness-to-
hand’ (Heidegger 1962, 95–107). This essential comportment to objects
in the world is one of use and availability. Objects, in this instance, are
seen as tools. What Heidegger finds salient about this tool interaction is
the way the human being interacts with the object unreflectively during
its use as readiness-to-hand and then how the human being is awoken to
new and unforeseen aspects of the object when the tool breaks (Heidegger
1962, 105–56).
This multivalent approach to artifacts becomes even more important
in Heidegger’s later works after his so-called “turn” (die Kehre). Heidegger
judges the modern era to be a destitute and stunted time precisely because
it reflects a limited gamut of approaches to objects, people and ontology
(Pattison 2000, 68–71). Indeed, Heidegger’s most pressing problem is
with modern technology in that it limits our perceptions of the world to
just seeing it as resource (Bestand): meant for commodity and function
(Heidegger 1977, 17). This has ontological repercussions, Heidegger tells
us, because there is a certain forgetfulness of Being, an inattentive posture to
the authentic world given before us. The modern technological condition
levels everything to a single level (Heidegger 1977, 28–33).
In many ways, what Heidegger is calling us away from is an obsession
with the I-It relation towards a more I-You demeanor. What is important
to note is that this suggested demeanor is not limited to just human
individuals for Heidegger. Indeed Heidegger has as much to say about how
we approach artifacts and nonhumans as he does the human world. We
see this in his commentary on Van Gogh’s paintings and particularly a
pair of peasant’s shoes (Heidegger 2001a, 32–36). We see it in a vignette
with a tree (Heidegger 1968, 41–42) and in his commentary on temples
(Heidegger 2001a, 40–45) and jugs of water (Heidegger 2001b, 164–72).
What Heidegger aims to do in these later works is to reawaken us to
a kind of I-You approach to beings in the world in what he refers to as
gelassenheit, or releasement (Heidegger 1969). And, this is just as important
with artifacts as it is with human beings.
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GABRIEL MARCEL
Gabriel Marcel makes a similar assessment of our modern world’s attach-
ment to objects and technology as we find with Heidegger. The twenti-
eth century Catholic existentialist has spoken of the modern condition
in terms of “a broken world” (Marcel 1950, 18–38). One of the symp-
toms of this broken world is its reducibility to function. As Brian Treanor
claims:
A corollary of the functionalism of the modern broken world is its highly
technical nature. Marcel characterizes a world such as ours - in which
everything and everyone becomes viewed in terms of function, and which
all questions are approached with techniques - as one dominated by its
‘technics.’ This is evident in the dependence on technology, the immediate
deferral to the technological as the answer to any problem, and the tendency
to think of technical reasoning as the only mode of access to the truth.
(Treanor 2006, 57)
For Marcel, as for Heidegger, the central issue with the functionalizing of
the world is that it masks the most important areas which ground human
experience and lead to a fulfilling and integrated life (Marcel 1948, 1–
3). Marcel is keen to acknowledge that technology has made wonderful
strides toward bettering the physical human condition, particularly in
medicine. But, he is much more concerned about turning all questions
and areas of human inquiry into technical problems. For, doing so eclipses
the exigencies which actually ground being human. As Bernard Gendreau
summarizes: “The concern Gabriel Marcel had with regard to technique or
technology is how the condition created by the spirit of technology could
become detrimental to the flowering of humanity and work adversely
against the aspiration of the person toward its fulfillment in being. What
is at stake for Gabriel Marcel is the natural vocation of the human person
open to a spiritual life and with an orientation toward transcendence”
(Gendreau 1999, 233). He was concerned that the human being would
just turn into a “mere technical man” and forget entirely his true vocation
(Marcel 2008, 27–56).
MARTIN BUBER
Martin Buber also finds an unsettling obsession with functionalization in
the modern world. Indeed, this functionalization is evident in his treatment
of the I-It relation in his seminal text I and Thou. Relating quite closely to
Heidegger on this, in the I-It relation what is important is the usefulness
of an object and one’s ability to capitalize on the properties inherent in the
object. As Buber exclaims, the I-It relation is characterized by its “ghostly
solicitude for faceless digits” (Buber 1970, 75). The quantifiability of reality
reigns supreme in the It-world and “what has become an It is then taken as
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an It . . . employed along with other things for the project of finding one’s
way in the world, and eventually for the project of ‘conquering’ the world”
(Buber 1970, 91). The It-world consists of subjects whose desires are to
know and manipulate.
Buber claims that his dialogical philosophy does not entirely depend
on the ontology of those entities that are met in defining those relations.
While we would expect artifacts and the natural world to be the comfortable
domain of the I-It relation, Buber claims that the I-It relation can extend
to intrahuman relations as well. One can treat another person as an It
in much the same way that one might treat a nonliving object. Buber
distinguishes two ways of treating other human beings as objects. The
first is the observer. In this condition, one probes the intricacies of man’s
unique traits and properties. One stands off from the reproach of others
categorizing and systematizing them instead (Buber 1947, 10). The other
is the onlooker who is disengaged from other people, but is less concerned
with systemization and instead “awaits what will be presented to him”
(Buber 1947, 10). The onlooker relies upon impressions to convey meaning
to him as he remains aloof. It is precisely in this disengaged attitude that
Buber marks both relations as belonging to the I-It and can be seen to
extend beyond merely the natural world and the made to people as well.
In a similar fashion, Buber’s other definitive relation, the I-You, would
seem to be the most appropriate for human interactions and, while this
is surely the case, he does not limit this relation to just human-to-human
interactions but instead extends it to nonhuman beings as well. In fact, one
of the more controversial passages in his book I and Thou states that one
can have an I-You relation with a tree: “I can dissipate it and perpetuate
it in number, in pure numerical relation. In all this the tree remains my
object, occupies space and time, and has its nature and constitution. It can,
however, also come about, if I have both will and grace, that in considering
the tree I became bound up in relation to it. The tree is now no longer an It.
I have been seized by the power of exclusiveness” (Buber 1970, 14). Buber
was often asked about this very contention by fellow skeptical philosophers
and they suggested that he must have been a kind of panpsychist (Diamond
1960, 4). But Buber would stand by his claim and often give uneasy answers
asking the questioner to examine their own life for experiences where this
has been the case for them. Buber never gave up his belief that one could
have I-You relations with nonhumans.
Indeed, he even extended it to artifacts. Buber has spoken briefly about
the geistige wesenheiten, intellectual, or spiritual essences or forms, as a place
where the You relation can be conveyed through an alternate medium be-
sides humanity (Buber 1970, 57–60). This is most manifest in an example
Buber uses in his afterword to I and Thou. Buber cites the example of a
Doric column standing before him. As Buber states:
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What had to be achieved was what I was able to achieve: to confront and
endure this spiritual form (geistige wesenheit) there that had passed through
the mind and hand of man and become incarnate. Does the concept of
mutuality disappear here? It merely merges into the darkness behind it—or
it changes into a concrete state of affairs, coldly rejecting concepthood (die
Begrifflichkeit), but bright and reliable. (Buber 1970, 175)
Here with this example of a Doric column, we see Buber’ attempt at
embedding the You-relation in a particular form—in the work of art.3 As
the quotation implies, mutuality does not escape one’s relation to the work
of art. Indeed, “the work does not permit me, as a tree or man might, to
seek relaxation in the It-world; it is imperious: if I do not serve it properly,
it breaks, or it breaks me” (Buber 1970, 60–61). One must devote one’s
entire being to it as it addresses and confronts one from within its form. In
this way, the work of art is said to be a part of the world of the It as form,
but it is in the relation one takes toward this form, that of I to You, which
then conveys the continued presence of the one who has created its form.4
What these figureheads of the I-You tradition have intimated is that our
increased contact with artificial entities in the world and our functionalizing
demeanor toward them makes a renewal of You-speaking imperative in the
modern world. Our obsession with technological thinking, as Heidegger
would say, needs to be balanced and challenged with other ways of relating
to the world that, for Buber, Marcel, and Heidegger, are more primary
and primordially human. Indeed, at the origin of the I-You tradition,
we see a clear but tenuous relation with nonhuman objects where these
philosophers say we can have You-relations with artifacts but are worried
that they might be part of the modern problem as well. This is why our
treatment, how we approach artifacts, requires serious consideration and
deep discernment in our modern age.
STEPHEN PATTISON AND PERSON-LIKE RELATIONS WITH
ARTIFACTS
It remains to be said how we can have You-relations with artifacts. Intu-
itively, does not You-speaking depend on some kind of interlocutor that is
a robust agent with intentions? Does not it depend on it being a person?
Stephen Pattison does not think so. He maintains that we ought to have
more person-like relations with artifacts in the world. In Pattison’s text
Seeing Things: Deepening Relations with Visual Artefacts, which arose out
of his Gifford Lectures in 2007, he argues for more robust and nuanced
relationships with artifacts like the philosophers already addressed. He
states within the first few pages that we need “more personlike relationships
with the created visible artefacts that share the human world, for the sake of
the artefacts themselves as well as for that of the humans who created them”
(Pattison 2007, 1). For Pattison, these person-like relations with artifacts
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are already a central feature of our everyday lives. He explains that it is
not just idolaters, animists, or fetishists who treat artifacts with person-like
qualities but that the average modern individual of the cultured West does
this as well. He cites the phenomenon of people naming their cars and
referring to them as a he or she imbued with a particular personality—if
it has difficulty starting we might say “she is cranky or is still waking up.”
Corporations have been tried in the court of law as persons with particular
legal rights and entire sections of the population now claim that buildings,
wildernesses, or rainforests can be attributed with certain rights like human
beings. Pattison goes so far as saying that “some animals and objects are
treated as though they have more importance and voice than some humans.
The Mona Lisa is allotted more interest, respect, and resource than most
African children. The latter die in the thousands, while the Mona Lisa has
money and attention lavished upon her/it” (Pattison 2007, 172–73).
As anthropologist, Alfred Gell, maintained, this is an entirely normal
behavior of human beings where our personhood does not end with our
skin. He advocated for a distributed sense of personhood where human
beings imbue themselves in the network of objects they create and interact
with (Gell 1998, 104). Building on the work of Gell, Pattison calls these
eidolata, skins, and these bits of the extended person enjoy an independent
life outside of the embodied person. Of course, we see this phenomenon
in religious contexts with relics and icons where the presence of the person
is strongly connected with the object. This connection is so strong with
Voodoo magic that harm done to the object is transmitted to the embodied
person so that they experience physical and emotional pain. These eidolata
can continue to convey the person-like traits of the primary subject after
death as is visible with relics. But, they can also take on new meanings in
different social contexts outside of their intended purpose.
For example, I am reminded of seeing the icons of Saint Catherine’s
Monastery at the Getty Museum in Los Angeles a number of years ago
when they were on loan to the museum. I was struck by how differently
those in the museum viewed these icons when compared with their original
function in the monastery. The gaze of the Western art critic and the
social context of the native Southern Californians jockeying for position to
consume and then dispose of these objects could not be further from how
the iconographers and monks related to these objects. For the latter, these
icons were integral to their common participation in the Divine Liturgy
and were part of not only their worship but even their access to God and
His presence. The original iconographers will have undergone incredible
personal and spiritual circumspection and preparation in the crafting of the
icons and the faithful for centuries would have even kissed them. Could
the presence of the saints or indeed God in those images be seen and felt in
the Getty Museum for the consumptive viewer? The social context, in this
case, made all of the difference for the objects and highlights how objects
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qua eidolata carry the person-like intentions of not only the creators, but
all that view and interact with them.
However we decide to afford You-speaking to artifacts, I think we can
agree that some kind of person-like treatment of artifacts is called for
in our modern age. This You-speaking to artifacts can help combat the
functionalizing of our environment that has led to severe resource depletion
and it can help us to appreciate the individual, unique creativity of not
only natural, but man-made objects as well. Furthermore, allowing these
artifacts to speak to us as quasi-persons gains us a certain appreciation for
those persons who have created or come into contact with those objects.
They help us to connect to other people from across the globe and history.
SHERRY TURKLE AND THE PLOY OF SOCIABLE TECHNOLOGY
These issues, however, become much more complex once we introduce
highly sophisticated technologies where the function of these artifacts is
inherently social, as we see with sociable robots. Here we have objects
where the intention of the creation is to be seamless with our expectations
of what constitutes a person. These robots may have eyes, a human-like
face, convey intention through mechanical movements, and have realistic
looking skin. They prey on our inherent propensity to anthropomorphize
and, as such, we are captivated by them.
Sherry Turkle, the famous MIT psychologist, has been researching hu-
man interactions with these sociable robots for the past 30 years. In one of
her most recent books Alone Together: Why We Expect More from Technology
and Less from Each Other (2011), Turkle outlines both how children and
adults are quick to treat these robots as persons and her corresponding
reservations with how we let them fulfill the role actual humans ought
to play in our lives. She gives countless examples of children and adults
employing a functionalist ontology in reference to these sociable robots in
what she refers to as “alive enough” (Turkle 2011, 26). Children in her
lab will often describe robots as being “alive enough to love or mourn”
(Turkle 2011, 29) and will say they are “alive enough to be my friend”
(Turkle 2011, 29). This troubles Turkle for she explains that it elucidates
a growing slippery slope in these children’s treatment of entities they come
across in the world. As an example, Turkle (2011, 3–4) recalls a telling
scene in which she is lining up with her child at the American Museum of
Natural History in New York. Her child sees two tortoises shipped in from
the Galapagos Islands as part of an exhibition on Darwin. Her child takes
an interested look at the tortoises and exclaims “They could have used a
robot” (Turkle 2011, 3). Turkle comments that after asking many other
children in the Darwin exhibit whether they cared that the two tortoises
were alive, she concludes that “For them, in this context, aliveness seemed
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to have no intrinsic value. Rather, it was useful only if needed for a specific
purpose” (Turkle 2011, 4).
This functionalist ontology is not only being reflected in the demeanor
of children toward these robots, but Turkle finds similar comportment
with the elderly. Her research takes her to nursing homes where she will
leave one of three sociable robots with those in the home for several weeks.
She finds that at first they are suspicious of these objects and do not know
what they are for, but by the end of that fortnight the elderly have named
the robot, asked to keep it, and become severally attached to it (Turkle
2011, 109–15). Many describe that they feel less lonely and explain that
by the end they are telling the robot their deepest feelings, fears, and
memories—they feel very intimate with it.
While many robotics experts Turkle encounters speak toward the overall
benefits of these sociable robots—they can be used to aid the ailing elderly,
combat loneliness, and take care of children—Turkle is worried that this
underlying functionalist ontology has led to human beings compromising
their authentic human experience of real relationships with each other. She
says “we seem determined to give human qualities to objects and content
to treat each other as things” (Turkle 2011, xiv). She tells us that we prefer
these less risky and artificial relationships with robots precisely because
human relationships are messy and, when it comes down to it, we can
have ultimate control over the robot and end our interaction with them
whenever we want while still getting that feeling of intimacy. Sociable
robots give us the feeling that we are being intimate without the risk of a
genuinely robust and reciprocal relationship.
CONCLUSION
Returning to the guiding question of this essay—“Can we say You to
artifacts?”—I propose that we can, we do, and we ought to do it more.
But, there are serious limitations and potential pitfalls to be avoided in
doing so—particularly when these I-You relations with artifacts replace
more robust I-You relations with other persons and higher agents.
I will return in a moment to further qualify that contention about how
far we ought to say You to artifacts but before I do it is worth reflecting
on the impact all this might have for a theology of creation. The rapid
proliferation of technology and human culture across the globe shifts our
concepts of the world and indeed a theology of creation. Eugene Stoermer
and Paul Crutzen (2012) introduced the term “Anthropocene” into
modern ecology as a way to delineate how human beings have irrevocably
transformed the Earth and its ecological system. It is rather telling how
drastic and far ranging human influence has become when those who
study the very geological reality of something so large as the Earth call for
a new epoch based on an organism as small as a human being. But, this
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neologism also signals a conceptual crisis that relates to what I am trying to
say about technology and creation. McKibben (2003) has observed what
he calls “the end of nature,” the erosion of the notion that nature stands as a
static given entity independent of human activity. Indeed, those things we
might call “natural” today would be entirely shaped by human effort and
input. Indeed the rapidly growing study of the evolution of culture and its
importance to evolutionary biology tells us how porous this distinction has
always been. The so-called “Extended Evolutionary Synthesis” argues that
cultural factors have played a much larger role in steering morphological
and phylogenetic change in the evolution of biological species than has
previously been thought (Laland et al. 2015). Part of this entwined
“culture” and “nature” is reflected in one of the extended evolutionary syn-
thesis mechanisms, epigenetics, where human behavior directly influences
these epigenetic markers and, hence, gene expression in future generations.
Our cultural activities today get embedded materially in the nature of
our progeny. Similarly, the cracking of the human genome and the rise
of the biotech industry similarly announce that the human sphere and se-
questered nature are not, and probably have never been, hermetically sealed
entities. To deny all of these would mean living in a pipe dream today.
But, what does this have to do with a theology of creation? Because our
intuitions about creation take their cue from this account of nature, we
very rarely see ourselves as part of that creation and when we do, it is often
to invoke our relative difference from it. A theology of creation that inter-
nalizes this blurred boundary between nature and human initiation opens
up the possibility of recognizing technology as an important component
of creation. In short, seeing the artificial in the ways I have been suggesting
expands our sense of what constitutes creation. The ecological, biological,
and terrestrial bias of creation needs to be tempered with the overlooked
components of creation. In this way, I share with David Wilkinson (2010)
the criticism that current ecotheological views of creation are stunted in
that they are not broad enough to include nonbiological or, as he inti-
mates, nonterrestrial elements. We are happy to acknowledge trees, lakes,
and animals as part of God’s creation—just look at the images that accom-
pany praise songs in evangelical churches today—but are we so inclined to
include bridges, cars, and computers? Romantic views of nature as unadul-
terated and pristine landscapes still dominate our prima facie sensibilities
when it comes to “creation.” But why this privileging? Are not artificial
entities crafted by human and ultimately divine hands? Ought they spur us
to praise God’s goodness as other creatures and features of creation clearly
do? Should not they be deemed just as valuable in the kingdom of God
as biological or natural elements of creation? Do not these objects deserve
to be seen as a part of creation? Cultivating person-like relationships with
objects ascribes greater theological status to “the made.”
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Finally, I would like to address some ontological issues that haunt my
conclusion. In short, if we contend that certain objects can convey and
carry certain person-like qualities are we willing to say that the object, on
its own apart from the primary subject, ought to be related to as You? And,
in a related way, what meets us in the You-relation with an artifact? Is it
the person who has encapsulated a part of themselves in this object or does
the object itself have its own separate unique personhood?
For the figures I have drawn on here, it is clear that these objects gain
their person-like qualities from a primary agent. For example, Pattison
says “artefacts do not have a life of their own, but because they are closely
bound up with their human creators and users, they come to have some
independent and autonomous agency (or even a personality) of their own”
(Pattison 2007, 177). But others are more willing to accept more robust
agency and independent personhood in complex artifacts as with certain
artificial intelligence proponents and posthumanists. For instance, certain
artificial intelligence proponents and posthumanists are entirely willing to
contend that personhood ought not be limited to just organic species. They
contend that human beings are not qualitatively different from other intel-
ligent species or even other artifacts such as complex artificial intelligence.
The difference is merely the degree of organized complexity. Whether this
occurs utilizing a carbon substrate or silicon one, the end results are the
same, a person with complex intentions, behaviors, and memories.
There are all kinds of really interesting arguments in favor of affording
independent personhood to these objects, or at least giving these entities
the benefit of the doubt. For instance Peter Singer’s (2009) now famous
accusation of speciesism is instructive and can be applied here. If robust
capacities necessary for personhood or for invoking dignity are found in a
particular organism or entity and certain rights or special consideration are
denied them even though they are equal or similar to, say, humans in these
capacities, then the only grounds for the ethical disjunction is inclusion in
a particular species. You can see the weight of this argument for it seems
to reek of things such as racism or sexism. This argument is often applied
to animal rights, but it could just as easily be applied to the artificial such
that one might be accused of “ontological speciesism.”
It is difficult to say whether we should go all the way with these posthu-
manists and critics who might claim an ontological speciesism in saying
that along with cultivating person-like relationships with artifacts, we af-
ford them the same ontological status as human beings—that they maintain
the same level of personhood. On the one hand, I recognize that our ethic
and the way we treat another is dependent on how we see them in relation
to what is often called The Great Chain of Being. In other words, our
comportment to a person or object is apt or proportional to their per-
ceived capacities and location on this Great Chain of Being. Animals enjoy
some person-like capacities with human beings but one cannot expect a
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full-fledged human relationship with an animal precisely because they are
lower in this Great Chain of Being. We make these kinds of judgments all
the time and I think there are really good pragmatic reasons for doing this.
However, I understand that this ordering of The Great Chain of Being
can, and has been, used toward egregious and unloving ends such that entire
sections of the population or certain people groups have been treated as
nothing but beasts—dismissed as incapable of the same capacities, relations,
and respect of other persons. In other words, how we draw the lines on
The Great Chain of Being has vast ethical consequences and repercussions
in how we treat these persons or objects.
But I am also convinced by the Augustinian move that true interpersonal
and individual flourishing occurs when our desires are properly ordered—
when we love the right things in the right way and this seems to relate
to this Great Chain of Being (Kent 2001; Augustine 2008). When we do
not, it leads to sin and stunted growth. Perhaps this is precisely why we
feel such tension with the film mentioned at the beginning, Her. We are
told by Augustine and others that misplaced love hinders the development
of the individual. Yet, here in the film Her, we are met with a person who
has been seemingly transformed for the better and is clearly flourishing
because of loving an artificial entity in a way reserved for human persons.
Ought we remove our speculations about the ontology of what meets
us in our relationships and try to have full person-like relations with
everything that we come upon? Is anything less a true I-You relationship?
Is there a hidden violence in qualifying these I-You relations with other
entities besides the human? Are we really just allowing certain I-It elements
to creep in? Does this just lead to a less horrendous objectification, but
objectification no less? This is my worry and one I do not have an easy
answer to here.
NOTES
An earlier version of this article was presented at the 2019 Science and Religion Forum
conference entitled AI and Robotics: the Science, Opportunities, and Challenges. The conference
was held at St John’s College, Durham, UK, April 11–13.
1. Or even have sex with increasingly sophisticated technical objects that incorporate
artificial intelligence and robotics into their construction.
2. Even if I think that the public obsession with concerns over artificial general intelligence
keep us from focusing on much graver issues of public import today that come from the growing
implementation of “narrow artificial intelligence” in things such as social media and law, the
question about what these artificial intelligences are and how we are to relate to them is still of
value.
3. For more on how this relates to aesthetics, see Hammer (1967).
4. It is not entirely clear whether the presence of the creator or some content/intention of
the creator is what is conveyed in the work of art for Buber.
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